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IMPORTANCE OF THE CARRYBACK REFUND PROVISIONS

A Statement by Maurice Austin,CPA
Chairman, Committee on Federal Taxation
American Institute of Accountants

The nature of current discussions of the carryback tax refund provisions
indicates a need for a clear understanding of the background, purpose, and.
operation of these provisions.
After we entered the war, excess profits tax rates on corporations were
raised to 90 per cent, as part of the plan to "tax the profits out of war”.
Experience in the last war indicated that, when war production ceased, there
would inevitably be sustained losses and expenses, such as inventory losses,
losses on sale or abandonment of war plants, reconversion costs and the like,
which would have been directly generated by war production operations, and
that taxation of war production profits at 90 per cent without taking into
account post-war losses and expenses of this type, would result in taxation
of more war profits than were earned, and, in effect, would constitute a
taxation of capital.
Serious consideration was given by Congress to the allowance of current
deductions against war profits of reserves for such anticipated losses and
expenses, and the Ways and Means Committee went so far as to make a
preliminary recommendation for the allowance of reserves for inventory losses.
Allowance of tax deductions for such reserves, however, was finally deemed
inpracticable to administer and, instead, Congress, after long and careful
consideration, enacted provisions for a two-year carryback of net operating
losses and unused excess profits credits for the specific purpose of acting
as a substitute for the more direct reserve method of dealing with the problem.
The theory of the carrybacks was that it was to be expected that the warrelated losses and expenses, when incurred, would create net operating losses
and unused excess profits tax credits, the carryback of which would, in
general, have the effect of offsetting such war-related expenses and losses
against profits in the years in which the war-time operations were carried on.
When these provisions were enacted, it was generally understood, and,
in fact, it is quite clear from their specific purpose, that they were to be
retained in the law so long as might be necessary to accomplish the purpose
of offsetting war-related expenses and losses against war-time profits. When
the excess profits tax was repealed in the Revenue Act of 1945, it was felt
that the reconversion process was advancing with such rapidity that it could
safely be assumed that the major part of the war-related expenses and losses
would have been incurred by the end of 1946, and, for that reason, the
carryback provisions were limited so as to involve only unused excess profits
tax credits arising no later than December 31, 1946.

It is well to bear in mind that the incurring of a loss or expense in
1946 does not necessarily result in a carryback giving rise to a refund.
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A refund carryback arises only where the effect of an expense or loss is to
reduce the corporation’s 1946 income below that corporation’s pre-war "normal
earnings”, as determined for excess profits tax purposes either by reference
to the company’s earnings record in the years 1936 through 1939 or on the
basis of a fixed rate provided by law on the corporation’s invested capital.
For example, let us assume that a company whose normal pre-war annual earnings
were $1,000,000, throughout the war period earned substantially in excess of
that figure; if this company would have made $1,800,000 in 1946, except for
certain losses and expenses which amount to $600,000, its 1946 income after
such losses and expenses would be $1,200,000 - still in excess of the pre-war
"normal” of $1,000,000, and there would be no carryback refund. If the
expenses and losses were $1,000,000, the 1946 income would be $700,000 $300,000 below normal, resulting in an unused excess profits tax carryback,
and a refund of approximately $136,500.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the carryback provisions do
not have the effect of making it profitable not to make money, or to lose
money, merely for the sake of getting carryback refunds. Notwithstanding
all the tax refund provisions, it still remains true that a corporation
makes more money by making money than by not making money.

It is no doubt true that the carryback provisions, like many other
provisions of the tax laws, may be abused by some taxpayers, and Congress has
been giving some attention to this problem. Some of the more flagrant types
of abuse, such as may be involved in a postponement of corporation liquidation
merely for the sake of obtaining an unused excess profits tax credit to carry
back, or the diversion of profitable 1946 operations from a company which
paid large excess profits taxes, so as to give the latter an appearance of
having an unused excess profits tax credit to carry back, can probably be
dealt with by the administrative authorities under existing provisions of law.
The suggestion that some companies might find it profitable to conduct
a "management sitdown” seems exaggerated; first, because a going concern
would inevitably sustain a loss in goodwill far exceeding any carryback
refund it could secure, and, second, because it still remains true, as
already stated, that a corporation makes more money by making it than by
not making it, carryback refunds notwithstanding.

Still another situation deals with so-called "forward-looking" expenses,
such as costly advertising and selling campaigns, and price-cutting
competition, which are productive of future benefits, and do not relate to war
time operations, but may create a 1946 unused excess profits tax credit
resulting in carryback refunds. Whether this is of sufficiently wide-spread
importance to merit action, and whether it is any different than cases of
similar expenditures made and allowed as deductions during years in which
excess profits tax rates were in effect, is open to serious question.
Undoubtedly, when the carryback provisions were enacted, the nature and
extent of present labor disputes was not clearly foreseen. However, it was
foreseen that there would be an economically unsettled period after cessation
of war production which would give rise to many of the losses and expenses
for which provision was being made through the carrybacks, and, from that
point of view, it may well be argued that costs and losses arising from
present labor difficulties are part of the general class of expenses and
losses growing out of wartime operations which, in a general way, Congress
had in mind in enacting the carryback provisions.
In any event, it would not be too much to say that it would be calamitous
if notoriety given to some possibilities of abuse should be used as a basis
of the repeal of the carryback provisions, upon which business has relied and
planned and with which it has been asked to be content as a substitute for
more direct dealing, through reserves, with the problem of war-related expenses
and losses incurred upon cessation of war production.

